This article provides a landing page for participants attending the International Symposium of CENSE: Beyond Listening 3: Re-Sounding Rights of Nature, 15-17 October 2026, Gdansk, Poland. This article is being updated continuously during this period, as I learn by conversing with other participants. In particular I wish to acknowledge the work and thoughts of Swedish ecologist Pella Thiel.
Introduction
Field recording begins with extraction. No matter the intentions, each such act imposes a human will on a more-than-human world. Given this conundrum, how can artistic practices that use field recordings challenge the ideologies of the Anthropocene that see the human as apart from – and superior to – the rest of Nature? This is a problem I have been wrestling with for some time. And likely I won't end up with any definitive answers, only an artistic practice that acknowledges the questions.
Given the theme of Beyond Listening 3, we must consider that a remedy might be found in the Rights of Nature (RoN) movement. There is an obvious emotive appeal in granting non-human entities rights. When Stone argued for giving trees “standing,” he tapped into a deep desire many of us have to rectify environmental wrongs by acknowledging other lifeforms [Stone 1972].
But several critical writers have raised objections that do not seem to be explicitly considered by RoN proponents. By emphasising these, I place myself in opposition to the majority of attendees at the conference. Though I don't seek conflict, critical inquiry requires dissenting voices. So here are my considered objections in brief.
1. RoN has an unworkable and contradictory premise
The RoN movement has largely been based on Thomas Berry’s Ten Principles [2001]. Berry claimed that existence alone grants legal rights to an object regardless of self-consciousness or sentience. Therefore rights apply to a species as a whole, individuals of a species (an insect, a tree... but also a rock) and to aggregates of such individuals (a river, a meadow).
The problem here is obvious. How can the rights of one lifeform be judged against another, considering relationships of predation, parasitism, and symbiosis? Many of the specific examples from the RoN movement use entities that we, as humans, view with positive affects. But consider replacing the organism in question with something less appealing.
Should the SARS-CoV-1 virus have standing? Wouldn't the COVID-19 vaccine then be an act of genocide? What about building houses from stone or concrete? Don't those entities have the right to their own untroubled existence?
(And, no, this not a reductio ad absurdum as it strictly follow's Berry's principles.)
2. RoN is unsuccessful legally
RoN ordinances in the USA have been enacted at the municipal level for exactly twenty years, since the first success in Tamaqua Borough (Pennsylvania, USA). But this local decision (population 7000) remains untested in a court. Even the Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund website is pessimistic about its chances, since state law is specifically constituted to over-rule municipal law [CELDF 2015]. In fact a survey of such cases concludes that each local ordinance has been overturned when challenged [Sachs 2024].
This is not to say that the victory here had no effect, since it did, in fact, keep companies from expanding their polluting activities. But this victory is built on shifting sands.
The other famous instance was Ecuador, a country which enshrined RoN principles in their 20th constitution (in 2008). Nonetheless, the state continues to encourage extractivist activities. The logic of RoN has even been used against local artisans [Tănăsescu 2020, 438]. Again, this victory is not as clear cut (a phrase I use advisedly!) as it first appears.
3. Environmental protections already exist
Doesn't it make more sense to build on existing environmental protections that enshrine decades of blood, sweat, and tears shed by ecology warriors? Why turn to the problematic field of rights?
After all, existing efforts have had significant successes. Air quality as been improved in China as renewable energy sources replace fossil fuels. The Great Lakes of North America have significantly improved in water quality, as have waterways in Copenhagen. Deforestation in the Amazon has decreased and threatened species recovered. And so on and so forth for hundreds of examples.
Now I do not wish to argue that these measures are sufficient in the face of post-capitalist excess. But such examples do at least make the case that RoN is not necessary for good to happen.
Of course it can be argued that existing environmental protections do not go far enough or have been subverted in the past. Everyone who has been involved in the ecological movement soon realises that the development of an ecocentric society faces enormous hurdles [Purdy 2015, 256-261]. This will be a lifelong battle and much power will always be arrayed against us.
Is there anything particular to RoN that might change this outlook? Perhaps the emotive appeal can build a larger popular consensus around the issues. For me that is not enough to ignore the other objections.
4. RoN ethics does little to challenge normative power structures
Since rocks, rivers, and trees cannot speak for themselves, humans will be put in charge, deciding what issues will be raised and how. This continues the ideology deeply embedded in Abrahamic religions: that humans are superior to the rest of nature and can use the world as a standing reserve (to use Heidegger's phrase). Despite the desire to combat extractive principles, RoN continues to operate within existing epistemologies. This is deeply problematic.
I grew up in Canada and for a time I was politically active with the Green party. I held the position of Riding President for local elections and sat on the organising committee of a national conference. The Greens in and around Antler River (London, Ontario) worked with First Nations people in order to develop alternatives to the (failed) democratic process. Given this personal experience, I can assert that Indigenous thinking provides a valuable alternative to settler law, particularly in how it uses consensual decision-making as an alternative to (what we call) democracy.
I view it as unfortunate that some Indigenous peoples have adopted RoN principles as a practical buffer against environmental harm. Tanasescu wrote that “the radical character of Indigenous ontologies is not fully reflected in the concept of legal personality” [2020, 453]. That's putting it mildly. Taking up the weapons of settler culture against the enemy is unlikely to end well in the long run. One side has all the money and all the lawyers. And now you're playing on their turf.
So, what's the alternative?
An alternative would begin by acknowledging the position of humans in a relational matrix, what Arne Naess termed a “biospherical net or field of intrinsic relations” [1973, 151]. Nature proceeds the human both temporally and ontologically. Nature has no rights, has no responsibilities, owns nothing. It is not constrained by human epistemologies. Nature is instead a wild field of potentialities which reveals itself to us in subtle phenomenal gestures. Our duty of care requires putting Nature first as the figurative (and literal) ground on which we stand when resisting hegemonic forces.
I believe that this approach accords with the beliefs of First Nations and Inuit peoples. For them “[t]he natural world is considered home, and the rightful stance to take upon her is a respectful, interconnected one of stewardship and gratitude” [anon 2023].
At the political level, ecocritical thought would continue to empower communities to fight legal battles using existing legislation, while also expanding such laws where possible. Formulating philosophical alternatives to ideologies of extraction does not mean giving up on praxis.
I need to emphasise this point, since the first reaction I get to this proposition is that I am being “too idealistic.” Come on! Anyone who is still struggling against climate change and the forces of capitalism, patriarchy, etc. must be idealistic as a prerequisite!
Finally, it is worth reminding us all that most of the activities that enhance ecocritical practices do not happen within legal frameworks. Community-building, knowledge-sharing, problem-solving, border-bridging... these are far more valuable in the long run. This is true regardless of one's position on the RoN, its efficacy, or its philosophical validity.
Listening
As an example of related artistic practice I present “Caged Birds (Augmentation).” This four-channel composition was derived from a local dawn chorus. The modifications made to the recording echo how humans have transformed those avian species who continue to survive our urban environs. The title is a play on John Cage, but also a reminder that a recording is a sound that is no longer at liberty.
Listen to a stereo version on SoundCloud. You can ignore any prompts for creating an account.
Poster
Download a screen resolution version of the poster which is somewhat outdated.
Further reading
I have been developing a robust philosophy of listening related to my practice as a composer. See Parmar 2026.
References
anon. 2023. “Natural World,” First Nations Pedagogy Online [website]. available
Berry, Thomas. 2001. “The origin, differentiation, and role of rights.” available
CELDF. 2015. “Tamaqua Borough, Pennsylvania,” Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund [website], 31 August 2015. available
Heidegger, Martin. 1977. The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt. London: Garland Publishing.
Kauffman, Craig M. and Pamela L. Martin. 2017. “Can rights of nature make development more sustainable? Why some Ecuadorian lawsuits succeed and others fail,” World Development 92, 130–142.
Naess, Arne. 1973. “The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement: a summary,” Inquiry 16.1, 95-100.
Parmar, Robin. 2026. “Before Listening: Ambience as Aletheia,” Journal of Sound Studies 29, np. New version available.
Purdy, Jedediah. 2015. After Nature: A Politics for the Anthropocene. London: Harvard University Press.
Sachs, Noam H. 2024. “A wrong turn with the rights of nature movement,” The Georgetown Environmental Law Review 36:39, 39-84.
Stone, Christopher D. 1972. “Should trees have standing? Towards legal rights for natural objects,” Southern California Law Review 45.450, 450-501.
Tanasescu, Mihnea. 2020. “Rights of nature, legal personality, and indigenous philosophies,” Transnational Environmental Law 9.3, 429-453.
Warnock, Mary. 2012. “Should trees have standing?,” Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 3, 56–67.
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